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MARK A. GRABER 
Professor Kay’s increasingly lonely crusade for interpreting constitutional 
provisions in light of their original intentions captures how constitutions should be 
implemented immediately after ratification, with the important proviso that 
expectations matter as much as intentions. Insisting that the constitution on day 
one mandates X, even though everyone responsible for the constitution thought the 
constitution mandated not X, violates common sense. A jurisprudence of original 
intentions at day one acknowledges that constitutions are political documents that 
serve political purposes and avoids making linguistic theory the practical arbiter 
when debates break out over impeachment procedures, the regulation of slavery, 
and the status of state sovereign immunity. At day one, Professor Kay’s 
originalism best captures the constitutional commitment to rule of law and the 
underlying constitutional politics of ratification. Intentions and expectations guide 
the planning processes facilitated by the rule of law. Framers, at least in the 
United States, spend far more energy making predictions about how the 
Constitution will work than in laying out the meaning of particular phrases. The 
persons responsible for a constitution focus on intentions and expectations rather 
than meanings because their concern is with how the constitution as a whole will 
work and not with the best interpretation of a particular constitutional clause.   
The reasons for preferring original intentions/expectations to original public 
meanings at day one provides grounds for abandoning all originalisms at day ten. 
If original public meaning cedes too much constitutional authority to linguists at 
the moment of ratification, both original public meaning and original 
intentions/expectations cede too much constitutional authority to historians over 
time. Doctrinalism at day ten better captures the constitutional commitment to rule 
of law than any form of originalism. When planning, people are far more likely to 
assume that constitutional decision makers will continue to do what they are doing 
than base decisions on original public meanings that may be unknown to both the 
planners and constitutional decision makers. Purposivism at day ten better 
incorporates constitutional developments—particularly those constitutional 
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MARK A. GRABER * 
INTRODUCTION 
Constitutional politics in Fredonia1 is structured by the excellent and 
widespread use of digital technologies. The Constitution of Fredonia was 
ratified by a popular referendum an hour after the final version of that text 
was approved by the constitutional convention that drafted that 
constitution.  This ratification procedure had previously been approved by 
the people by a process that was remarkably consistent with every known 
consent theory. The conventional debates were public, followed intensely, 
and discussed in great detail in ways that left no segment of the Fredonian 
population believing that they lacked the time or information necessary to 
consider their ratification vote. Article I of the Constitution of Fredonia 
provides that the delegates at the constitutional convention will 
immediately upon ratification become the legislature of Fredonia.2 This 
provision was well known and adequately debated by both the members of 
the constitutional convention and by the general public. Remarkably, the 
final Constitution of Fredonia is almost identical to that of 1787. The only 
exceptions are the above provision in Article I, the inclusion of Article III, 
which is identical to the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States, and a provision in Article V of the Constitution of Fredonia, 
that declares “this Constitution shall not be amended until ten years have 
passed after ratification.”3 
The first debates in the Fredonian legislature, which began the 
afternoon the people ratified the constitution, revealed several related 
problems. Each concerned a divergence between what members of the 
Fredonian legislature agreed was the original public meaning of a 
                                                                                                                     
* Regents Professor, University of Maryland Carey School of Law. Thanks to Yaniv Roznai, 
Richard Kay, and the members of the symposium honoring Professor Kay’s exceptional work, and to 
Adam Kuegler and Alexandria Madjeric for their patient editing. 
1 Fredonia is the fictional country in the Marx Brothers movie, DUCK SOUP (Paramount Pictures 
1933). 
2 See CONSTITUTION FOR THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES OF 
AMERICA, in 5 THE COMPLETE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
CONFEDERATE STATES 94, 94 (Mark A. Graber & Howard Gillman eds., 2018) (describing similar 
provisions in the Confederate Constitution). 
3 See RICHARD ALBERT, CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS: MAKING, BREAKING, AND CHANGING 
CONSTITUTIONS 204–05 (2019) (discussing the existence of similar provisions in several national 
constitutions). 
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particular constitutional provision and what members of the Fredonian 
legislature agreed were the original expectations of the Fredonian people 
when they ratified the constitution.4 Article I, Section 3, paragraphs 3 and 5 
plainly mandate that the Vice President shall preside over the Senate when 
the Senate determines whether to convict an impeached Vice President.5 
Nevertheless, no Fredonian intended, anticipated, or expected that the 
constitution would permit any person to be a judge in their trial, 
impeachment or otherwise. Article I, Section 8, paragraph 3 plainly 
mandates that Congress may regulate interstate commerce. Fredonians 
agree: that the interstate slave trade is interstate commerce; that 
prohibitions on commerce are forms of regulation;6 that a good faith 
constitutional interpreter could conclude that original public meaning of 
the commerce clause sanctions legislation regulating purely in-state 
activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce;7 and that 
slavery has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.  Nevertheless, no 
Fredonian intended, anticipated, or expected that the constitution would 
permit the Fredonian legislature to forbid immediately the interstate slave 
trade or prohibit human bondage throughout the land.8 Article III plainly 
mandates that citizens of a state may sue their home state when making a 
claim “arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and 
Treaties made.”9 Nevertheless, Fredonians intended, anticipated, or 
expected that no state could be sued in federal or state court without the 
permission of that state.10 
How Fredonians should make these constitutional choices depends on 
the proper resolution of a longstanding debate between proponents of 
original public meanings and proponents of original intentions. Most 
contemporary originalists claim that constitutional provisions mean what 
                                                                                                                     
4 The claims below about the original meaning and original intention of the Constitution of 
Fredonia are stipulations. Whether Americans in 1787 had the same expectations or the same 
understanding of the original public meaning of the relevant constitutional provisions is beyond the 
scope of this Paper. See infra notes 36–42 (noting these debates in the American context). 
5 For this issue in the United States, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, Someone Should Have Told 
Spiro Agnew, in CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES 75, 75 (William N. 
Eskridge Jr. & Sanford Levinson eds., 1998); Joel K. Goldstein, Can the Vice President Preside at His 
Own Impeachment Trial?: A Critique of Bare Textualism, 44 ST. LOUIS L.J. 849 (2000). 
6 See United States v. William, 28 Fed. Cas. 614, 621 (D. Mass. 1808) (discussing how the 
government may abridge commerce in the interest of regulation). 
7 See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) (holding that the commerce clause allows for 
the regulation of any instate activities with substantial effect on interstate commerce). 
8 For this issue in the United States, see Randy E. Barnett, From Antislavery Lawyer to Chief 
Justice: The Remarkable but Forgotten Career of Salmon P. Chase, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 653, 654 
(2013); MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL 116 (2006). 
9 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
10 For this issue in the United States, see John E. Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to 
Create Causes of Action Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth 
Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1422 (1975). 
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the language of the provision meant to the general public the moment the 
provision was ratified.11 The Constitution of Fredonia, interpreted from this 
perspective, plainly mandates that the Vice President of the United States 
presides when the Senate determines whether to convict an impeached 
Vice President, plainly vests Congress with the power to regulate the 
interstate slave trade, arguably vests Congress with the power to prohibit 
slavery throughout the land, and plainly authorizes the national legislature 
to give federal courts jurisdiction over suits between a citizen and that 
citizen’s unconsenting home state. Professor Richard Kay and many 
members of the previous generation of originalists claim that constitutional 
provisions mean what the framers of those provisions intended or expected 
the moment the provision was ratified.12 The Constitution of Fredonia, 
interpreted from this perspective, does not mandate that the Vice President 
preside over the Senate when the Senate is determining whether to convict 
an impeached Vice President, does not permit the First Congress to ban 
either the interstate slave trade or prohibit slavery throughout the land, and 
does not authorize the national legislature to give federal courts jurisdiction 
over suits between a citizen and that citizen’s unconsenting home state.   
The divergence between original public meaning and original 
intentions/expectations that Fredonians are experiencing must occur the 
instant the constitution is ratified. Both original public meaning and 
original intentions/expectations purport to be facts about constitutional 
politics at the time the constitution was ratified. Proponents of original 
public meaning champion the “fixation thesis.” This thesis maintains that 
the original public meaning of a text is fixed at publication or, in the case 
of a constitution, at ratification.13 The original public meaning of Article I, 
Section 3, the Commerce Clause, and Article III, Section 4 of the 
Constitution of Fredonia are the public meaning of those provisions when 
they were ratified. What people intend or expect at a certain time is also a 
historical fact. Constitutional ratifiers may subsequently change their 
minds or revise expectations in light of new evidence. Nevertheless, their 
public intentions/expectations at the moment of ratification fixes the 
original intention/expectation of the constitution, just as their physical 
                                                                                                                     
11 See ROBERT W. BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A 
DEBATE 2–3 (2011) (“Although the first generation of originalists focused on the original intentions of 
the framers, contemporary originalists believe that the original meaning of the Constitution is the 
meaning that the words and phrases had (or would have had) to ordinary members of the public.”). 
12 See Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three 
Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226, 229–36 (1988) (laying out the nature of original 
intentions adjudication and describing the author’s model as one which “calls for judges to apply the 
rules of the written constitution in the sense in which those rules were understood by the people who 
enacted them.”). 
13 See Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original Meaning, 
91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 1 (2015) (“The meaning of the constitutional text is fixed when each 
provision is framed and ratified . . . .”). 
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position at the time of ratification fixes forever where they were when the 
constitution was ratified. The original intentions/expectations respecting 
who presides over the trial of an impeached Vice President, congressional 
power to regulate slavery, and state sovereign immunity are what 
Fredonians intended or expected when they ratified the Constitution of 
Fredonia. If, therefore, both original public meaning and original 
intentions/expectations are facts about constitutional politics at the moment 
of ratification, then any divergence between the two must occur at 
ratification. 
Original public meaning and original intention/expectations are the 
only means for interpreting a constitution at day one. At day one, public 
meaning originalism and textualism are identical. Some textualists insist 
that the plain meaning of a constitutional text may change over time,14 but 
no time has elapsed for that change to occur. Independent doctrinal 
analysis at day one is impossible. No binding precedents exist that deviate 
from either original public meaning or public intention/expectation.15 
Various forms of purposivism at day one collapse into original intentions 
or expectations. Dworkin’s distinction between concepts and 
conceptions,16 for example, occurs only over time. Ratifiers at day one 
believe that the best conception of the concept of equal protection is the 
conception they had of equal protection when the constitution was ratified. 
Constitutions must live a bit for living constitutionalists to come to believe 
that the best application of a general constitutional provision diverges from 
that intended or expected by the framers. 
Part I of this Essay defends at day one Professor Kay’s increasingly 
lonely crusade for interpreting constitutional provisions in light of their 
original intentions. Insisting that the constitution on day one mandates X—
even though everyone responsible for the constitution thought the 
constitution mandated not X—violates common sense. A jurisprudence of 
original intentions at day one acknowledges that constitutions are political 
                                                                                                                     
14 See LESLIE FRIEDMAN GOLDSTEIN, IN DEFENSE OF THE TEXT: DEMOCRACY AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 3 (1991) (claiming that a textualist may interpret constitutional provisions 
in ways that “need not have been present in the conscious minds of the framers”). 
15 Constitutional decision makers may choose to borrow from other regimes, but binding 
precedents are limited to decisions made interpreting the national constitutional, none of which at day 
one have been made. To the extent Fredonians at day one maintain that the Constitution of Fredonia 
should be interpreted consistently with the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, they 
are making either an original public meaning argument (the average Fredonian understood the meaning 
of constitutional provisions to be as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States) or an 
original intention/expectation argument (the average Fredonian intended or expected that Fredonian 
decision makers would be guided by the Supreme Court of the United States). See Jamal Greene, Rule 
Originalism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1639, 1641–43 (2016) (providing a discussion of original public 
meaning and original expectations). 
16 See Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 3: The Place of Liberty, 73 IOWA L. REV. 1, 6 
(1987) (“Liberty and equality . . . are concepts that admit of different interpretations or conceptions.”). 
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documents that serve political purposes and avoids making linguistic 
theory the practical arbiter when debates break out over impeachment 
procedures, the regulation of slavery, and the status of state sovereign 
immunity. At day one, Professor Kay’s originalism best captures the 
constitutional commitment to rule of law and the underlying constitutional 
politics of ratification. Intentions and expectations guide the planning 
processes facilitated by the rule of law. Framers, at least in the United 
States, spend far more energy making predictions about how the 
constitution will work than in laying out the meaning of particular phrases. 
The persons responsible for a constitution focus on intentions and 
expectations rather than meanings, because their concern is with how the 
constitution as a whole will work and not with the best interpretation of a 
particular constitutional clause.   
Part II maintains that the reasons for preferring original 
intentions/expectations to original public meanings at day one provides 
grounds for abandoning all originalisms at day ten. If original public 
meaning cedes too much constitutional authority to linguists at the moment 
of ratification, both original public meaning and original 
intentions/expectations cede too much constitutional authority to historians 
over time. Doctrinalism17 at day ten better captures the constitutional 
commitment to rule of law than any form of originalism. People, when 
planning, are far more likely to assume that constitutional decision makers 
will continue to do what they are doing than base decisions on original 
public meanings that may be unknown to both the planners and 
constitutional decision makers. Purposivism, which encompasses 
structuralism and aspirationalism,18 at day ten better incorporates 
constitutional developments, particularly those constitutional developments 
ratifiers did not anticipate, than either original public meaning or original 
intentions/expectations. 
This Essay breaks from almost all forms of originalism by highlighting 
the importance of original expectations.19 Expectations, the following 
pages suggest, are the stuff of constitutional politics. Expectations at day 
one provide the foundation for constitutional practice. People ratify a 
constitution on the basis of expectations about how the constitution will 
work. That the framers expected a certain result is, therefore, a reason at 
day one for constitutionally mandating that result. Much constitutional 
                                                                                                                     
17 For a brief outline of doctrinalism, see MARK A. GRABER, A NEW INTRODUCTION TO 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 78–81 (2013). 
18 For a brief outline of purposivism, see id. at 81–83, 85–86. 
19 For originalist objections to a jurisprudence of original expectations, see Lawrence B. Solum, 
Incorporation and Originalist Theory, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 409, 414 (2009) (arguing that the 
“linguistic meaning . . . of a text” is different from “expectations about the application of that 
meaning”); Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 295–97 
(2007) (discussing the difference between “original meaning” and “original expected application”). 
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debate is a consequence of constitutions failing to perform as expected. A 
jurisprudence that begins with original expectations will not resolve our 
contemporary constitutional problems, but is more likely to identify their 
cause than a jurisprudence that purposes to resolve contemporary problems 
by returning to the constitution in pristine form oblivious to how the 
constitution operating in pristine form is creating those problems.   
I. ORIGINAL INTENTIONS/EXPECTATIONS AND ORIGINAL PUBLIC MEANING 
AT DAY ONE 
Common sense dictates interpreting political documents at day one 
consistent with their original intentions or expectations. If the United 
States and Russia conclude an arms agreement that both parties expect will 
obligate each party to dismantle a particular weapon system, then that 
agreement should be interpreted as obligating each party to dismantle that 
weapon system, even if, on inspection, that result may not be mandated by 
the original public meaning of any provision in the treaty. The United 
States and Russia concluded the agreement because they anticipated that 
result. Interpreting the agreement in light of the original public meaning of 
treaty provisions when those treaty provisions diverge from the original 
expectations of the treaty would defeat the point of the agreement. The 
arms agreement is unlikely to survive one party unilaterally declaring they 
are not to be bound by the original intended expectation. 
Common sense dictates that the same originalist principles should 
govern how constitutions are interpreted at day one. People ratify a 
constitution because they expect certain outcomes. Fredonians anticipated 
that an impeached Vice President would not preside over his or her Senate 
trial, that Congress would not ban the slave trade or slavery, and that states 
would not be sued without their permission. Constitutions are likely to 
malfunction immediately at day one if interpreted consistently with their 
original public meaning rather than original intentions/expectations. 
Interpreting Article I, Section 3 consistently with that provision’s original 
public meaning will immunize the Vice President of Fredonia from official 
sanction until the provision forbidding new constitutional amendments 
expires. States in Fredonia may face bankruptcy if Article III of the 
national constitution is not interpreted consistently with their anticipated 
immunity from private lawsuits for monetary damages. Justice may 
demand that states honor their contracts,20 but Fredonians committed to the 
rule of law will note that all parties to those contracts understood when 
they were made that Fredonian states had to consent to any lawsuit for 
nonpayment. 
                                                                                                                     
20 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 456 (1793). 
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Slavery highlights the importance of treating constitutions as political 
documents. Prominent public meaning originalists in the United States 
celebrate those abolitionists who pointed out that, as a matter of original 
public meaning, the Constitution could easily be interpreted as 
anti-slavery. Randy Barnett urges contemporary constitutional theorists to 
take their cues from Lysander Spooner, who used a version of original 
public meaning to conclude that slavery was always unconstitutional in the 
United States.21 The political problem with Spooner’s original public 
meaning is that no southern framer at day one would have tolerated such 
an interpretation for an instant. Lysander Spooner’s constitution was not 
the Constitution most Americans thought they were ratifying in 1787, even 
if Spooner’s understanding of original public meaning was correct. Had 
Congressional majorities at day one began the process of emancipating all 
slaves in the United States or Fredonia, the point of the constitutional 
bargains over slavery would be defeated. Both regimes would have fallen 
apart almost immediately.   
Original intentions/expectations treat ratifiers as political actors with 
political purposes. Kay writes, “Legal obligations arise because we 
recognize law-making authority vested in certain human beings.”22 What 
matters is what these political actors think they are doing when they draft 
and ratify constitutional texts. Persons can achieve political goals 
constitutionally only through communication. Nevertheless, when 
implementing constitutional and other political texts, priority should be 
given to what the ratifiers were consciously trying to achieve rather than to 
what they may have accidentally communicated. If Fredonians intended 
their constitution to provide an effective impeachment process, disable 
Congress from immediately prohibiting the slave trade, and grant states 
immunity from private lawsuits for monetary damages, those expectations 
should guide how the Constitution of Fredonia should be implemented at 
day one. “[I]t is hard to see,” Kay writes, “what the political rationale 
would be for a theory that elevates a text for reasons unrelated to the 
people and circumstances which created it.”23     
Original public meaning at day one replaces politics with etymology. 
Rather than ask what people thought they were doing when they drafted 
and ratified constitutional provisions, those who champion original public 
meaning turn to linguistic theory when determining who presides over the 
trial of an impeached Vice President, whether Congress may ban the 
                                                                                                                     
21 See generally Randy E. Barnett, Was Slavery Unconstitutional Before the Thirteenth 
Amendment: Lysander Spooner’s Theory of Interpretation, 28 PAC. L.J. 977 (1997) (discussing 
Lysander Spooner’s theory that slavery was unconstitutional before the passage of the Thirteenth 
Amendment). 
22 Kay, supra note 12, at 232. 
23 Id. at 234. 
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interstate slave trade, and the conditions over which persons can sue states 
for monetary damages. Lawrence Solum, the leading champion of public 
meaning originalism, maintains “the communicative content of the 
constitutional text was fixed at the time each provision was framed and 
ratified”24 and “that the original meaning of the constitutional text should 
constrain constitutional practice.”25 One problem with this substitution is 
that constitutional decision makers lack the knowledge necessary to 
evaluate a contested theory of meaning. The more important problem is 
that what might constitute interpretation in other enterprises should not 
govern what constitutes interpretation in political enterprises. 
Constitutional decision makers lack the expertise to determine the 
merits of the linguistic theory underlying original public meanings. Solum 
insists that, while context matters, we can determine the communicative 
content of a constitutional provision independently from the intentions of 
the persons responsible for that text.26 We can determine the meaning of 
“interstate commerce” with only minimal attention to other constitutional 
provisions and the overall structure of the Constitution.27 Kay disagrees,28 
as does Lawrence Lessig.29 Lessig insists that constitutional provisions do 
not have meaning independent of other constitutional provisions and the 
overall structure of the text. The commerce clause is part of a 
Wittgensteinian language game,30 and cannot be understood in absence of 
all elements of the constitutional language game.31 Lessig writes, 
The question of the commerce clause’s power is not 
determined on its own. It is instead read along with the 
necessary-and-proper clause . . . in light of a more general 
principle about implied limits on the scope of an 
“enumerated constitution.”32 
Whether this is a correct understanding of Wittgenstein is beside the 
point. Constitutional decision makers who at day one know their conscious 
public intentions when ratifying the constitution have no basis for choosing 
                                                                                                                     
24 Solum, The Fixation Thesis, supra note 13, at 7. 
25 Id. at 1. 
26 Id. at 27–29. 
27 See id. (distinguishing between original intentions and original public meaning). 
28 Kay, supra note 12, at 229–30. 
29 LAWRENCE LESSIG, FIDELITY & CONSTRAINT: HOW THE SUPREME COURT HAS READ THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 191 (2019). 
30 See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 11–12 (G.E.M. Anscome trans., 
Basil Blackwell & Mott, Ltd., 3d ed. 1958) (1953). 
31 On this point, see generally Ian C. Bartrum, Wittgenstein’s Poker: Contested Constitutionalism 
and the Limits of Public Meaning Originalism, 10 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 29 (2017). 
32 LESSIG, supra note 29, at 46. 
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between interpretations of Wittgenstein or some other philosopher33 when 
determining whether the original public meaning of the words they used is 
not consistent with the constitutional expectations/intentions. 
Kay and others recognize that the constitutional rules for the 
impeachment process, the constitutional status of slavery, and the 
constitutionality of suing unconsenting states for monetary damages cannot 
possibly turn on the dominant understanding of “interpret” in 
contemporary linguistic theory.34 Common sense belies claims that 
whether someone ought to be executed, whether the President can torture 
suspected terrorists, and whether Congress may require healthy persons to 
buy life insurance depends, even in part, on the proper interpretation and 
evaluation of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations.35 Proponents of 
original meaning go awry by beginning with a generalized theory of 
interpretation and then asking whether that theory of interpretation should 
constrain constitutional decision makers.36 Kay and other constitutional 
theorists adopt the better approach. They first consider how a constitution 
should be implemented and then describe their best conclusions or all 
plausible conclusions as “interpretation.”37 This approach is consistent with 
the meaning of “interpret” in constitutional practice. Supreme Court 
opinions routinely use “interpret” in ways inconsistent with originalist 
theory.38 Philip Bobbitt describes six different methodologies for 
determining the meaning of constitutional provisions only one of which is 
related to original public meaning.39 Original intentions and original 
expectations are more important than original public meanings when 
interpreting political documents because those documents are designed to 
bring about consciously intended results and expectations rather than 
communicate certain meanings that framers may not have been aware of at 
the moment of ratification. No one should care whether poetic 
interpretation is as dependent on original intentions or expectations. The 
                                                                                                                     
33 See Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
479, 489–90 (2013) (relying heavily on Paul Grice, even as he acknowledges “significant” differences 
in their accounts of meaning). 
34 See, e.g., Kay, supra note 12, at 289 (claiming contemporary majority opinions are not reflected 
in the original intentions of drafters). 
35 WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 30.  
36 See Solum, The Fixation Thesis, supra note 13, at 1–2 (distinguishing between a theory of 
meaning and a theory of constitutional “constraint”).   
37 Kay, supra note 12, at 231–32.  
38 See, e.g., Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1963 (2019) (referring to “a longstanding 
interpretation of the Double Jeopardy Clause”); Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2126 (2019) 
(discussing the approach of “understanding statutory interpretation as a ‘holistic endeavor’ which 
determines meaning by looking not to isolated words, but to text in context, along with purpose and 
history”). 
39 PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 9 (1982). See, e.g., 
PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991) (continuing the arguments made in 
BOBBITT, supra). 
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role of original intentions or expectations and original public meanings in 
poetry depends on the nature and purposes of poetry rather than on some 
universal standard for determining what should be called “interpretation” 
in all human endeavors.40 
Rule of law values favor interpreting constitutional provisions at day 
one consistently with their original intentions/expectations. The rule of law 
is desirable, commentators point out, because stable law enables people to 
plan. Frederick Schauer explains, 
Arguments for rule-based decision-making have traditionally 
focused on the ability of rules to foster the interrelated virtues 
of reliance, predictability, and certainty. According to such 
arguments, decision-makers who follow rules even when 
other results appear preferable enable those affected to 
predict in advance what the decisions are likely to be. 
Consequently, those affected by the decisions of others can 
plan their activities more successfully under a regime of rules 
than under more particularistic decision-making.41 
Ratifiers plan on the basis of their conscious intentions and 
expectations. Fredonian voters anticipate that impeached officeholders will 
not preside over the Senate trial that determines whether to convict an 
impeached officer. Fredonian slave holders commit to union on the 
assumption that Congress will not immediately ban the international slave 
trade or prohibit slavery altogether. States make fiscal plans confident they 
cannot be sued for monetary damages.   
Ratifiers do not plan on the basis of original public meanings when 
those meanings diverge from their conscious public intentions or 
expectations. No one can be wrong about or unaware of their conscious 
intentions or expectations, but people can be mistaken or unaware of the 
original public meaning of a constitutional provision. Fredonians may not 
have read the Constitution with sufficient care to realize that Article I 
mandates that the Vice President presides when the Senate determines 
whether to impeach a convicted Vice President. Fredonian slaveholders 
may simply have taken members of the ratifying convention at that their 
word when they declared “the Constitution gives the national government 
                                                                                                                     
40 These constitutional practitioners are unlikely to accept interpretation by the discernment of 
original public meaning and debate whether original public meaning should constrain constitutional 
decision-making. There is a strong sense that the persons responsible for implementing a constitution 
should interpret that constitution. Calling a process “interpretation,” in this sense, is a powerful 
argument for legitimacy. For this reason, rather than decide what constitutes interpretation first, we 
should consider how the constitution should be implemented and describe our best conclusion or all 
plausible conclusions “interpretations.”   
41 FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF 
RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 137–38 (1991). 
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no power to emancipate slaves.”42 When ratifiers are aware of a divergence 
between their original intentions/expectations and the original public 
meaning of a constitutional provision, they will plan on the basis of their 
original expectations. Fredonian state officials who believe assurances that, 
despite what appears to be the plain meaning of Article III, states will 
enjoy immunity from private suits for monetary damages43 will budget 
consistently with the anticipated immunity.   
Original intentions/expectations capture what citizens debate when 
constitutions are framed and ratified, at least in the United States. Consider 
several of The Federalist’s greatest hits. 
• “Extend the sphere and you take in a greater variety of 
parties and interests; you make it less probable that a 
majority of the whole will have a common motive to 
invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common 
motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it 
to discover their own strength and act in unison with 
each other.”44 
• “A local spirit will infallibly prevail much more in the 
members of Congress than a national spirit will prevail in 
the legislatures of the particular States.”45 
• “Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The 
interest of the man must be connected with the 
constitutional rights of the place.”46 
• “[T]he judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will 
always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the 
Constitution . . . .”47 
These claims are all predictions about what would happen should the 
Constitution be ratified. Nowhere in the Federalist Papers do Hamilton, 
Madison, or Jay explore the original public meaning of the commerce 
clause or any other provision that has been the subject of interpretive 
controversy for the past two centuries. Hamilton asked, “What is the 
liberty of the press? Who can give it any definition which would not leave 
                                                                                                                     
42 See 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 286 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1974) (quoting Charles Cotesworth Pinckney: 
“We have a security that the general government can never emancipate them, for no such authority is 
granted”). 
43 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 487–88 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(explaining that states have sovereign immunity from lawsuits). 
44 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 83 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
45 THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, at 296 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
46 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
47 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
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the utmost latitude for evasion?”48 Many Federalists described 
constitutional restrictions on government, standing alone, as “parchment 
barriers.”49 Anti-Federalists leaned as heavily on expectations rather than 
on analyses of original public meaning. When Brutus declared, “[t]he 
judicial power will operate to effect . . . an entire subversion of the 
legislative, executive and judicial powers of the individual states,”50 he was 
making a prediction based largely on his belief that federal judges “will be 
interested in using this latitude of interpretation.”51 
The debate over the Equal Rights Amendment illustrates how 
Americans consider expectations rather than public meanings when 
deciding whether to ratify short constitutional amendments. Jane Mansfield 
details how the proponents and opponents of the ERA considered whether 
that amendment would compel single-sex bathrooms, abortion, and women 
in the military.52 Few discussions outside the law reviews analyzed the 
public meaning of the phrase: “Equality of rights under the law shall not be 
denied or abridged by the United States or any State on account of sex.”53 
More often, debaters made predictions about how various governing 
institutions would interpret those words.54 In particular, Mansbridge notes 
how much of the debate centered on how the Supreme Court would likely 
implement the ERA.55 She initially favored influencing future Supreme 
Court decisions by “creating a legislative history that made clear 
Congress’s assumption that the ERA would not require the military to 
assign women draftees to combat on the same basis as men.”56 
Conservatives, Mansbridge notes, “feared that the Supreme Court would 
use the ERA in a multitude of unforeseeable ways, just as it has used the 
Fourteenth Amendment in ways no one foresaw when that amendment was 
being debated in the 1860s.”57  
Original intentions/expectations better capture how constitutions tend 
to be ratified as wholes, at least in the United States. Jack Rakove points 
out that Americans in 1787–89 voted on the entire Constitution, not on 
                                                                                                                     
48 THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 514 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
49 See Mark A. Graber, Enumeration and Other Constitutional Strategies for Protecting Rights: 
The View from 1787/1791, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 357, 362–63 (2007) (“Structural considerations 
trumped parchment barriers in 1787.”). 
50 Essays of Brutus, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 420 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981). 
51 Id. at 421. 
52 See JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LOST THE ERA 61–63, 84–89, 90–91, 112–13 (1986) 
(discussing the concerns of proponents and opponents of the ERA regarding its interpretation). 
53 Id. at 61. 
54 Id. at 60.  
55 Id. at 52, 60, 89. 
56 Id. at 89. 
57 Id. at 53. 
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particular provisions.58 Article VII was designed to require “the state 
conventions to approve or reject the Constitution as a whole—not to ratify 
it in parts.”59 Federalists insisted the “imbecility”60 of continued 
governance under the Articles of Confederation made ratification 
imperative.61 They pointed to all the luminaries who helped frame the 
text.62 Neither ratification strategy was conducive to considered reflection 
on the public meaning of constitutional provisions. Debate, even in state 
conventions that considered the Constitution provision by provision, 
centered on how the different parts of the Constitution would interact to 
produce a regime. Federalists and Anti-Federalists were far more 
concerned with expectations as to who would implement the Constitution 
than with the correct interpretation of constitutional language.63 Americans 
debated whether the Constitution would establish an aristocracy or 
promote rule by the virtuous.64 Slaveholders worried about southern 
control over national institutions.65 Alexander Hamilton spoke for all these 
constituencies in Federalist 31 when he declared, “all observations 
founded upon the danger of usurpation ought to be referred to the 
composition and structure of the government, not to the nature or extent of 
its powers.”66 
The American experience with ratification provides strong foundations 
for interpreting the Constitution on day one, consistently with original 
intentions/expectations when original intentions/expectations diverge from 
original public meanings. Americans, when debating the Constitution and 
subsequent constitutional amendments, spend more energy debating 
predictions about how constitutional provisions will be interpreted than on 
the correct interpretation of those provisions. They follow Hamilton and 
worry more about the institutions that implement constitutional provisions 
than the proper interpretation of the text. Many persons responsible for 
constitutions and constitutional amendments make decisions on the basis 
of who supports ratification and what they have been told are the 
consequences of ratification, rather than on a close reading of the text. To 
                                                                                                                     
58 JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 106 (1996). 
59 Id. 
60 THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, at 107 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).  
61 RAKOVE, supra note 58, at 188–89. 
62 Id. at 135–37. 
63 For the general contours of the debate, see id. at 131–60; MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, THE 
FRAMERS’ COUP: THE MAKING OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 397–545 (2016). 
64 See 1 HERBERT J. STORING, THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST: WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS 
WERE FOR 38–52 (1981) (discussing opposing perspectives of the Anti-Federalists and Federalists). 
65 See GRABER, DRED SCOTT, supra note 8, at 101–06 (discussing Southern interests in protecting 
slavery through the political process, “proponents of slavery were nationalists whenever they thought 
uniform federal legislation more likely than diverse state laws to serve Southern interests”). 
66 THE FEDERALIST NO. 31, at 196 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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move back to Fredonia, the following considerations suggest that if 
Fredonians ratified a constitution in part because they expected the Vice 
President would not preside when the Senate was considering impeaching 
a convicted Vice President, Congress would not immediately ban the 
international slave trade; states would be immune from private lawsuits for 
monetary damages; and the Supreme Court would not require women to be 
sent into combat. This would suggest popular sovereignty and common 
sense both favor interpreting the constitution consistently with what people 
thought they were doing when they ratified the text than with what 
linguistic theory informs the people of Fredonia the words of the 
Constitution of Fredonia actually mean.   
II. ORIGINAL INTENTIONS/EXPECTATIONS AND ORIGINAL PUBLIC 
MEANING AT DAY TEN 
Original intentions/expectations and original public meaning both over 
time become less attractive means for interpreting and implementing 
constitutions. As the temporal distance from ratification increases, 
alternative methods of constitutional interpretation become plausible. 
These alternatives better focus constitutional decision makers on 
appropriate questions for determining whether to execute murderers or 
allow Congress to pass a national health plan than either original 
intentions/expectations or original public meanings. Doctrinalism better 
guarantees the rule of law than any method of originalism. Various forms 
of purposivism better enable constitutional decision makers to respond to 
unanticipated constitutional developments. Original intentions/expectations 
has the virtue of asking an important question: is the constitution 
functioning as intended/expected? But it cannot provide answers to that 
question or questions about how the constitution should be implemented 
when important constitutional institutions and practices are not functioning 
as intended/expected.  
Americans, Fredonians, and other members of constitutional regimes 
gain additional interpretive opinions over time. Constitutional decision 
makers create precedents. These precedents sometimes fill gaps in original 
intentions/expectations/public meanings. Other precedents are inconsistent 
with original intentions/expectations/public meanings. These developments 
make doctrinalism possible at day ten. As gap-filling and inconsistent 
precedents accrue, constitutional decision makers must decide to remain 
originalists, committed to original intentions/expectations/public meanings, 
or become doctrinalists, committed to abiding by longstanding practice. 
Concepts and conceptions diverge. Citizens who at the time of ratification 
agreed that capital punishment was not cruel and unusual punishment may 
now conclude that capital punishment is cruel and unusual. Constitutional 
institutions do not function as expected. Citizens who anticipated that 
elected officials would be loyal to their home institution must decide how 
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to implement separation of powers principles when governing officials 
become more loyal to members of their party.67 These, and related 
unforeseen developments, make purposivism possible at day ten. As 
regimes change in ways unanticipated by the persons responsible for the 
constitution, constitutional decision makers must decide whether to remain 
originalists, committed to interpreting the constitution only in light of 
developments foreseen or accounted for by the persons who framed the 
constitution, or become purposivists, committed to finding ways to achieve 
original constitutional ends in light of unexpected constitutional 
developments.  
Common sense dictates that at day ten who presides over the Senate 
trial of an impeached Vice President, congressional power to ban the 
interstate slave trade, and state immunity from private suits for monetary 
damages should not depend on what an historian finds in an old attic. What 
prominent historians believe to be the original intentions or expectations 
and original public meanings of constitutional provisions changes over 
time. Some changes reflect better history or better historical methods. 
Other changes, most notably changes in the historiography of the 
post-Civil War Amendments, reflect ideological changes that influence the 
conclusions historians reach on originalism and what counts as evidence of 
original intentions, expectations, or public meanings.68 Even if 
constitutional decision makers professing history do not simply pick their 
favorite historians when making constitutional decisions,69 the history of 
history suggests no ideologically neutral history exists that achieves 
originalism’s promise of stable meanings rooted in objective facts.70 
                                                                                                                     
67 See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. 2312, 2324–25 (2006) (“[I]n the broad run of cases . . . party is likely to be the single best 
predictor of political agreement and disagreement.”). 
68 See PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RECONSTRUCTING RECONSTRUCTION: THE SUPREME COURT AND 
THE PRODUCTION OF HISTORICAL TRUTH 1 (1999) (describing how “[t]he competition to interpret 
Reconstruction history involves issues of race, rights, and national identity”); Randall Kennedy, 
Reconstruction and the Politics of Scholarship, 98 YALE L.J. 521, 521 (1989) (arguing that what 
“cements” the linkage between the Reconstruction period to the present is the “belief that ‘original 
intent’ should play an important, if not decisive, role in determining how statutes and constitutional 
provisions are applied”). This process of historical reconstruction rooted in present concerns began 
almost immediately after ratification. JONATHAN GIENAPP, THE SECOND CREATION: FIXING THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION IN THE FOUNDING ERA 3 (2018). 
69 See Mark A. Graber, Clarence Thomas and the Perils of Amateur History, in REHNQUIST 
JUSTICE: UNDERSTANDING THE COURT DYNAMIC 70, 70 (Earl M. Matlz ed., 2003) (describing that 
Justice Thomas’s originalism does not exhibit “the virtues claimed for originalism in theory” and 
would “dishearten proponents of that historical approach to constitutional interpretation or the judicial 
function”). 
70 See PETER NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM: THE “OBJECTIVITY QUESTION” AND THE AMERICAN 
HISTORICAL PROFESSION 1 (1988) (arguing that “[h]istorical objectivity is not a single idea, but rather a 
sprawling collection of assumptions, attitudes, aspirations, and antipathies” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
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Moreover, no one has suggested a good reason why Fredonians or anyone 
else at day ten should abandon longstanding practices simply because 
historians have uncovered manuscripts that seem to prove that 
longstanding doctrine, broadly thought to be rooted in original intentions, 
expectations, or public meaning is, in fact, inconsistent with what the 
framers intended or expected and the original public meaning of 
constitutional language. 
Doctrinalism at day ten better captures the rule of law values 
underlying constitutionalism than any version of originalism. Persons who 
at day one are more likely to be aware and plan on original intentions or 
expectations than original public meanings over time are more likely to be 
aware of and plan on longstanding precedents than original intentions or 
expectations. Journalists are more likely to be aware of the actual malice 
rule announced by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan71 than what the framers 
thought about the constitutional status of libel law. Speakers who believe a 
divergence exists between longstanding precedent and original intentions 
or expectations are likely to plan on the Supreme Court continuing to 
follow longstanding precedent, either because the Justices are doctrinalists 
or because the Justices are not likely to be persuaded to abandon mistaken 
beliefs that longstanding precedent is consistent with the original 
constitutional understanding of libel law.72 Aspiring writers seeking to 
avoid paying monetary damages can discover the contemporary status of 
libel law by reading the United States Reports. No one can plan on the 
basis of George Washington’s presently unknown journal of the 
constitutional convention, buried deep in the walls of Mount Vernon, 
which, when discovered, will reveal the definitive account of the original 
public meaning, intention, or expectation of federal power to regulate false 
statements about public officials.  
Some version of living constitutionalism and the Dworkian distinction 
between concepts and conceptions at day ten better captures the framing 
concern for a functional constitution than any version of originalism. 
Constitutions at day one are more likely to secure their animating purposes 
by being implemented consistently with their original intentions or 
expectations rather than being implemented consistently with their original 
public meaning over time because they are being implemented in the ways 
that best achieve those purposes in light of unforeseen developments, 
instead of being implemented in ways framers who did not anticipate those 
                                                                                                                     
71 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (declaring that the First Amendment “prohibits a public official 
from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves 
that the statement was made with ‘actual malice’”). 
72 No justice even responded when Justice Thomas called on the Supreme Court to rethink 
Sullivan in light of the original understanding of free speech. McKee v. Cosby, 139 S. Ct. 675, 676 
(2019) (Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari). 
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developments thought best. Constitutions are means for coordinating 
political activity, maintaining stable rule, fostering deliberative 
government, promoting national aspirations, and establishing the 
compromises that enable people with different values to share the same 
civic space.73 Ratifiers believe that a constitution implemented consistently 
with their original intentions or expectations will achieve those 
constitutional purposes only in light of shared assumptions about future 
developments. The constitutional compromises over slavery were rooted in 
widespread beliefs that slaveholders would always control at least one 
branch of the national government.74 The Civil War Amendments were 
rooted in expectations that a united antislavery Republican Party would 
control the national government for the foreseeable future.75 The problem 
at day ten is that time dashes many framing expectations. Westward 
expansion fueled an unanticipated and dramatic increase in free state 
population.76 The Republican Party became less powerful and less 
committed to racial equality after Americans ratified the Fourteenth 
Amendment.77 In these circumstances, framing purposes could no longer 
be achieved by the means the framers thought would achieve those ends; a 
united south after 1860 lacked the power to veto anti-slavery legislation.78 
The Republican Party after 1876 no longer had the popular support or 
inclination to pass legislation protecting persons of color.79 If, as original 
intentions/expectations maintain, framing purposes at day one should take 
priority when implementing the constitution, then constitutional decision 
makers should abandon original intentions/expectations at day ten when 
those intentions/expectations under changed circumstances are more likely 
to frustrate than achieve constitutional purposes.    
Consider a topical example of an instance when original constitutional 
means may subvert original constitutional purposes. Many framers may 
have preferred a narrowly defined impeachment clause because they feared 
legislators might invoke impeachment to bend a weaker executive to their 
will.80 The more vital constitutional problem at present is that Presidents 
                                                                                                                     
73 GRABER, A NEW INTRODUCTION, supra note 17, at 40. 
74 GRABER, DRED SCOTT, supra note 8, at 92–93. 
75 See Mark A. Graber, Teaching the Forgotten Fourteenth Amendment and the Constitution of 
Memory, 62 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 639, 646 (2018). 
76 See GRABER, DRED SCOTT, supra note 8, at 126–28. 
77 STANLEY P. HIRSHSON, FAREWELL TO THE BLOODY SHIRT: NORTHERN REPUBLICANS & THE 
SOUTHERN NEGRO, 1877–93 (1962). 
78 Mark A. Graber, Constructing Constitutional Politics: The Reconstruction Strategy for 
Protecting Rights 8 (Univ. of Md. Francis King Carey Sch. of L., Working Paper No. 1390, 2013), 
https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/fac_pubs/1390/. 
79 Id. at 104. 
80 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 65–69 (Max Farrand ed., 1966); 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 66, at 402–04 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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acting as near constitutional dictators may be enfeebling legislatures.81 
Interpreting the impeachment clause with a bias against legislative power 
will likely have perverse effects in a regime in which the executive is far 
more powerful and Congress far weaker than the framers anticipated. Plain 
constitutional language may not be interpreted away. Nevertheless, given 
the historic flexibility of the phrase “high crimes and misdemeanors,”82 the 
better view may be to give Congress more leeway than the framers might 
have to determine when and whether a President is unfit for office. 
A constitutional focus on original intentions or expectations is 
nevertheless vital for thinking about maintaining constitutional regimes. 
Constitutional regimes consist of a set of values, a set of institutions 
designed to achieve those purposes, and a people who are presumed to 
share those values and know how to operate those institutions.83 The most 
fundamental question for implementing a constitution over time is whether 
constitutional institutions when functioning normally still achieve 
constitutional values, whether the people still share those values and 
whether the people can operate the constitutional machinery in ways that 
achieve those values. Original intentions/expectations is the starting point 
for such analysis even if that alpha is not the alpha and omega.  
CONCLUSION 
Implementing a constitution at day ten requires a robust account of 
original intentions or expectations that incorporates the complex “web of 
beliefs”84 that explain why different Americans supported ratifying the 
Constitution. Some beliefs were about particular results. The framers 
expected that the Vice President would not preside over the trial of an 
impeached Vice President and that slave trade would not be banned at day 
one. Other beliefs concerned very general values. The framers were 
“dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.”85 The persons 
responsible for the Constitution had other beliefs at varying levels of 
generality. They believed free speech was an element of republican 
                                                                                                                     
81 The classic works in this tradition are ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL 
PRESIDENCY (1973); CLINTON L. ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS GOVERNMENT IN 
THE MODERN DEMOCRACIES (1948). 
82 See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, IMPEACHMENT: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 19 (2018) 
(“[A] recurrent point made during the ratification conventions and early years of the Republic was that 
the meaning of ‘other high crimes and misdemeanors’ had to be worked out over time.”). 
83 Stephen L. Elkin, The Constitutional Theory of the Commercial Republic, 69 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1933, 1943–49 (2001).  
84 W.V. QUINE & J.S. ULLIAN, THE WEB OF BELIEF (2d ed. 1978). 
85 Abraham Lincoln, Address Delivered at the Dedication of the Cemetery at Gettysburg (Nov. 
19, 1863), in 7 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 17 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953). See THOMAS 
JEFFERSON, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, THE PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON 235 (Merrill 
D. Peterson ed., 1975). 
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government and that states enjoyed some measure of sovereignty. As 
important, Americans in 1787 had beliefs about the nature of politics and 
future developments that help explain why they thought the institutions 
they had designed would have achieved the expected results. They 
expected that national politics would be less partisan than local politics.86 
They expected population shifts would maintain the balance of power 
between free and slave states.87 To add further complication, no two 
ratifiers based their support of the Constitution on identical belief systems. 
Some belief systems that supported ratification were very different from 
other belief systems that supported ratification. South Carolinians ratified a 
constitution that they anticipated would be far more pro-slavery than the 
constitution ratified in New Hampshire.88 
Persons implementing a constitution cannot maintain this web of 
beliefs, intentions, expectations, and public meanings in pristine form. 
Living originalists and others point out that over time constitutional 
decision makers regard as incoherent what appeared to the framers to be a 
fairly consistent belief system.89 As important, constitutional decision 
makers over time realize that the empirical foundations of the Constitution 
have crumbled. National politics is as partisan as local politics. Population 
is moving northwestward instead of the anticipated southwestern direction. 
The Constitution in these circumstances cannot be operated in pristine 
form. Severe constitutional failures are likely to occur should constitutional 
decision makers attempt to operate in pristine form a constitution designed 
on the assumption that national politics would be less partisan than local 
politics when national politics is more partisan than local politics. The 
Civil War resulted when Americans could not adjust original constitutional 
practices in light of unexpected demographic changes to meet the more 
vital goal of maintaining national unity.90  
The constitutional status of George Washington highlights the 
relevance and irrelevance of original intentions, or expectations, for 
                                                                                                                     
86 See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE IDEA OF A PARTY SYSTEM: THE RISE OF LEGITIMATE 
OPPOSITION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1780–1840, at 40–47, 70–72 (1969) (tracing the development of 
partisan politics in early America). 
87 GRABER, DRED SCOTT, supra note 8, at 92. 
88 See Robert M. Weir, South Carolina: Slavery and the Structure of the Union, in RATIFYING 
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89 See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 142 (2011); LAWRENCE LESSIG, FIDELITY AND 
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(analyzing the evolution of constitutional interpretation under originalism). 
90 GRABER, DRED SCOTT, supra note 8, at 153–71. 
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constitutional decision making at day ten. The framers expected George 
Washington to be the first President. Members of the constitutional 
convention allocated presidential power in part on the assumption that 
Washington would be elected. Charles Thach observed, “that the first 
President was to be Washington had an undoubted effect. When men spoke 
of the great national representative, of the guardian of the people, they 
were thinking in terms of the Father of His Country.”91 Pierce Butler, a 
delegate to the framing convention, maintained that executive powers 
“would not have been so great had not many of the members cast their eyes 
toward General Washington as President; and shaped their Ideas of the 
Powers to be given a President, by their opinions of his Virtue.”92 No one 
thinks that these expectations gave Washington a constitutional right to be 
elected. Nevertheless, granting future Presidents, most notably Donald 
Trump, the powers the framers expected to be wielded by someone with 
Washington’s character and abilities may subvert rather than sustain the 
constitutional order.93 
Professor Kay has made a vital contribution to constitutional 
scholarship by his dogged efforts to keep original intentions alive. His 
work reminds us that constitutions are political texts that constitutional 
decision makers should interpret and implement consistently with their 
animating political ends. Original intentions/expectations at day one avoids 
making linguistic theory the arbiter of important constitutional questions. 
Professor Kay correctly insists we keep constitutional attention on what 
people were doing when they ratified the Constitution and what they 
expected to be the fruits of their labor rather than on public meanings that 
many framers may not have considered. Original intentions/expectations at 
day ten highlights the many contemporary constitutional debates that are 
consequences of constitutional failures to perform as expected. The 
challenge constitutional decision makers face in the twenty-first century is 
finding the interpretive strategies that enable the Constitution to be 
implemented in ways that best serve the animating purposes of that text 
and subsequent amendments. This Essay joins Professor Kay’s 
distinguished efforts to put politics back into constitutional interpretation at 
day one, even as he would disagree strongly with my account of 
constitutional politics at day ten. 
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92 Pierce Butler to Weedon Butler (May 5, 1788), in THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
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93 See Sanford Levinson & Mark A. Graber, The Constitutional Powers of Anti-Publian 
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